Moshe Zak: America's December Pressure

The following op-ed is reprinted with permission from The Jerusalem Post. Views expressed are not necessarily those of IRIS or its staff.

Leiah and Jason Elbaum

IRIS

<http://www.netaxs.com/people/iris/>

By MOSHE ZAK

(The writer is a Jerusalem Post columnist.)

(November 26) -- Why was Binyamin Netanyahu asked to specify by the beginning of December the extent of the second redeployment in Judea and Samaria? And why did President Clinton invite Netanyahu to the White House specifically for December 4?

These two dates are a result of the approaching meeting of the congress of Islamic nations in Teheran on December 9. The Clinton administration wants to avoid extreme anti-American decisions at this conference, which it aims to do by creating a mini-crisis between Jerusalem and Washington, or alternatively squeezing concessions from Israel for which the US will get the credit.

Netanyahu's visit to the White House will provide an opportunity for the White House's Middle East experts to leak to the media that President Clinton censured the prime minister. This would help the Arab rulers known as "pro-Western" to take the anti-American sting out of the Teheran congress's resolution.

In fact, Clinton has already managed to offend Netanyahu by his conversation with Shimon Peres in which he slammed Netanyahu, but his aides assume that by the opening of the Teheran congress, these outspoken statements will have lost their strong impact. This is exactly why there is no reason for the prime minister to go out of his way to visit America within the next three weeks. It is doubtful that by then he will have managed to finish the package deal concerning the second redeployment - the second and final stage until the implementation of permanent status in Judea and Samaria.

What can Netanyahu promise Clinton, after the US president cast doubt on his trustworthiness - as Peres reported from Washington? Will the Palestinians really be satisfied with a total of 35-37% of the territory, taking all previous withdrawals together (Gaza, the six towns and the Hebron agreement), after receiving the impression that Netanyahu is crumpling in the face of American pressure? And without Palestinian agreement, will the Americans go on blaming Israel for the lack of progress in the diplomatic process?

A meeting just before the Teheran conference will assure public censure of Netanyahu by the Americans. There are people in Washington who think that the US needs public Israel-bashing to get safely through the Islamic congress. But Israel doesn't have to assist those latent desires.

There is no urgent reason for the prime minister to go to Washington in order to turn the other cheek. Any meeting with Clinton should be held after the US learns its lesson from the pan-Arab position on the Iraq crisis and, in particular, after Israel has proved to the Palestinians that pressuring Israel through Arab countries does nothing to promote their own interests.

Israelis have difficulties in freeing themselves from the mistaken impression that Israel is isolated in the international arena. Even if Netanyahu visits the White House; even if he does not meet Clinton within the next three weeks. The fact is that Israel isn't isolated at all. No week goes by without two or three agreements being signed with all kinds of countries, and no week goes by without visits from foreign ministers from all over the world. The feeling of isolation is subjective, influenced mostly by UN resolutions, mostly proposed by the Arabs as part of their psychological warfare against us. They are no reflection of the courageous bilateral links existing between Israel and many countries of the world.

Nor should we accept the date suggested by the secretary of state as the last possible date for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the extent of the second redeployment and a settlement freeze (a freeze labeled as "avoiding unilateral steps liable to provoke the other side").

The beginning of December is a convenient date for Americans to combat anti-Americanism at the Teheran congress. But there is nothing holy about it. It was not a surprise that Arafat turned down Netanyahu's proposal for the size of the new deployment which will bring under his rule 35-37% of the territories. The greater the area that Arafat receives, the greater the temptation for him to announce immediately and unilaterally the establishment of a Palestinian state. Dr. Amnon Kapeliuk, who interviewed Arafat, told me that the leader of the Palestinian Authority had told him explicitly that whether Netanyahu wanted it or not, he would proclaim a Palestinian state in May 1999.

This readiness of the Palestinians to proclaim a state even without Israel's agreement obliges Israel to hold on to the territorial cards for the permanent-status negotiations. This is the correct criterion for judging any American proposal on the continuation of the diplomatic process. Redeployment maps should not be drawn up on the basis of the dates dictated by the Baghdad crisis or the Teheran congress.

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