Section VIII Table of Contents
VIII: Preventative Measures and Rescue Attempts:
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Answering this question would require another FAQ unto itself. Luckily for us, NASA's already got one in the form of an online book. One of the better sources of "official" information as to how the decisions were made with regards to Shuttle design is the NASA historical report, NASA SP-4221, _The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA's Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle_ by T.A. Heppenheimer. As with quite a few of NASA's publications, an on-line copy of this document is currently available at:
Be advised that certain "behind the political scenes" facts may not be represented in this publication. If you have any questions in this regard, the Usenet newsgroups sci.space.shuttle and sci.space.history are excellent forums for this sort of discussion.
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The insulating foam that was seen to break off the ET was able to do so because it is on the outside of the tank. This is in contrast to the design of other large launch vehicles, such as the Saturn 5, where the insulation was on the *inside* of metal-walled tanks.
The reason for this is that the ET insulation is doing a somewhat different job on the Shuttle ET than is the case for other launchers. On, for instance, the Saturn 5, the internal insulation was purely to reduce the rate of boil-off of cryogenic (ultra-low temperature) propellants. It did not totally insulate the tanks, so the outer metal walls still became extremely cold; cold enough that water vapor from the air condenses and freezes into ice on the side of the launcher. At launch, such ice breaks free, often in quite large chunks. This is very clearly and spectacularly visible in many of the close-up films of Saturn 5 launches.
For the Saturn, this was not a problem, as the ice fell straight off the side of the launcher. There was little for it to hit on the way, and what there was was part of an expendable rocket anyway. On the Shuttle, the situation is very different. As is now well known, anything falling off the ET can hit the Orbiter on the way and potentially cause serious damage to the delicate TPS tiles. As such it is important to prevent the build-up of ice on the ET. For this reason the insulation is on the *outside*, and as well as helping keep the propellants cold, it also stops the outer layer of the ET from chilling so far that ice forms on it. Whatever the hazards posed by fragments of foam insulation breaking off and striking the orbiter, the hazards from chunks of ice would be far worse.One other thing to keep in mind is this: a very significant advantage of external insulation is that metals get stronger at low temperatures, meaning the walls of the tank can be thinner than if the insulation were on the inside.
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It takes a lot of energy (fuel) to reach orbital speed (~8km/s). It would take twice as much energy to both accelerate and decelerate from orbit, since rockets have to propel both the vehicle *and* the rest of the propellant the amount of fuel required to reach a specific speed scales *exponentially* with that speed. It is simply not even remotely feasible with current rocket technology to create a launch vehicle which is capable of both accelerating to and decelerating from orbital velocity. This is why all manned spacecraft utilize atmospheric drag to decelerate as they reenter from orbit, otherwise manned spaceflight would simply not be possible.
It would take *four* entire External Tanks full of fuel to take only *half* the weight of the Shuttle to orbit and then later decelerate it to a soft non-aerodynamic landing. Additionally, atmospheric braking has been by and large a very safe way to land (even including this one accident), the added difficulty and complexity of making manned spacecraft capable of decelerating to a soft landing would almost certainly lead to more vehicle losses and more crew deaths.
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An interesting question, considering so far there's only been two ways actually used to reenter the Earth's atmosphere from orbit: a ballistic or "cannonball" approach - as was used with Mercury, Gemini and Apollo, and is still used with Soyuz and pretty much any unmanned payload delivery from orbit - and the "glider" approach used by the Shuttle. But *is* there another way to get down? Or, at least, some alternate flying trick or two that might have relieved, at least in part, the thermal stresses on Columbia as those experienced on the left wing?
One such "trick" that's been batted about on the sci.space.* groups of late calls for using the intact side of the Shuttle to protect the damaged side. For example, if the left wing’s thermal protection was known to be damaged and the structural integrity possibly and probably compromised, the Shuttle could enter the atmosphere yawed or "crabbed" a little so that the intact side took more of the brunt of the reentry. Granted, there would have been a higher degree of damage done to the right wing than normally experienced on a Shuttle flight with the right wing tilted directly into the reentry plasma, but would such a manouver have made enough of a difference to protect the injured left wing?
During a recent interview with James Oberg, Leroy Cain, the NASA Flight Director on duty when Columbia was lost, isn't convinced it could.
“It’s theoretically possible,” said Cain, but emphasized that his fellow MCC controllers didn’t believe it would have worked because such a move would have only a small effect on the heat load. “There are lots of things you can do,” Cain added, “but they don’t necessarily solve your problem...You just lead to potentially other problems.”
In the case of Columbia, the “good” wing might have gone too far in sacrificing itself for the "bad" one. The plasma would have probably scorched through the right wing tiles and damaged the normally protected right side steering jets, or even suffered some other unanticipated catastrophic damage. Furthermore, this sort of procedure has never been tested per se even in the simulators, according to some sources inside of NASA. As with the issue of performing an inspection spacewalk without proper equipment or the ability to even grab onto the underside of the Shuttle, having to take on an unknown number of new risks while still dealing with an uncertain current risk in mid-flight would have not only been a Flight Director's nightmare, the odds of success would have been seriously unacceptable.
Granted, there's quite a few fighter jocks who'll claim they could have pulled it off, but based on what's known about how the Shuttle handles normally during reentry, the odds are the manouver wouldn't have provided enough protection to help either way.
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The following is derived from the Shuttle Crew Operations Manual, a 4" thick "user's manual" published by JSC's Flight Crew Operations Directorate. This gives a basic description of how Shuttle crew members can use their emergency equipment to bail out of a tumbling shuttle crew module. Of note are the following points of order:
Although no formal requirements or plans exist for crewmembers to bail out of the orbiter during uncontrolled flight, they may be able to do so under certain circumstances.
The hatch jettison pyrotechnics do not require orbiter power to function and can be activated even if orbiter power is lost.
Each crewmember is wearing his or her own emergency oxygen bottles and parachute, and if the crew cabin were not spinning rapidly, at least some of the crewmembers should be able to get to the side hatch and get out.
In the case involving loss of orbiter control, the crewmembers should activate their emergency oxygen as soon as possible and then evaluate the situation. The crew should remain within [the crew module until it passes through 40,000 feet.
If the cabin is depressurized, the partial pressure bladders in the Launch/Entry Suit will be inflated above 35,000 to 38,000 feet, so the crewmembers can judge altitude in that way.
Once out of the orbiter, crewmembers should pull their parachute D-rings to activate the automatic opening sequence for their parachutes.
The 18-inch pilot chute is deployed 1.5 seconds later and immediately deploys the 4.5-foot drogue chute.
The drogue chute stabilizes the crewmember down to an altitude of 14,000 feet, then deploys the main canopy.
Note that this loose set of procedures apply only to bailout from an uncontrolled descent. The procedures for a controlled descent are similar, but as the Shuttle is more stable the procedures are a bit more extensive and regimented.
Photos of SCES training at JSC. The training team even has its own group patch.
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During its test flight phase, Columbia had two ejection seats - one each for the CDR and PLT. When Columbia became operational and the crew expanded to up to a total of seven, the ejection seats and explosive roof panels were removed and replaced with normal ones for two reasons:
- Weight savings, simply put.
- The concept of not wanting to leave anyone behind in the Shuttle if bailout was required. Some of the crew were seated on Columbia's lower deck, and ejection seats could not have saved the three crew there in any circumstance.
At the same time, the ejection seats were more of a concession to the test pilot mentality. In actuality, they would have been entirely useless at the altitude and speed that Columbia - or any shuttle, for that matter - was going when the disaster occurred. They would really only have been useful if the shuttle was going slowly, at low altitude, as in the case of a bad landing approach. The seats were deactivated after the first four missions, and removed shortly afterwards during a post-mission refurbishment.
One other point regarding ejection seats that should be made: Unfortunately, plain old ejection seats are just not very useful during ascent. The problem is that, as one might expect, ejecting into the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) exhaust plumes is pretty much a certain death. And yes, if you wait long enough for the SRBs to burn out, you've also waited too long and are now outside the operating envelope of any reasonable open ejection seat design. An enclosed or "clamshell" design along the lines of what the B-58 Hustler or the XB-70 Valkyrie used might have a better chance, but would require some not-too-moderate redesign of the crew cabin and the flight deck of each of the remaining Shuttles.
Bottom Line: Regardless of how 20/20 hindsight is, the justifications for the lack of ejection seats on the Shuttles are fairly valid, but thanks to those same justifications there's no quick fix available at this time other than the bailout procedures already implemented.
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There are several factors to consider here:
- First off, NASA officials have seen insulation and ice break off and impact tiles on the underside on previous flights. In fact, one of the tasks assigned to the STS-107 crew was to take photographs of the External Tank immediately after MECO and tank separation to see just what, if anything, had broken off, where it broke loose, and how big it really was. This is a routine task that's been assigned to all Shuttle crews. Those photos were taken, but sadly they will probably not be recoverable.
- With this in mind, no danger was perceived at the time by either the crew or NASA, and was explicitly stated as such shortly after Columbia achieved orbit. Even if there had been some suspicions, there was simply no way for the crew to perform any sort of check of the underside of the shuttle. For SPACEHAB missions, the RMS is usually removed for weight savings as it won't be used. Regardless, the RMS simply cannot be manouvered so the camera on the grappler end can see the underside from the proper angles to determine the depth of any damage. It simply lacks the joint structure and lengths to certain struts to allow for this.
- While the SPACEHAB was mounted in the cargo bay, Columbia's normal internal airlock and the upward hatch in the tunnel between the airlock and SPACEHAB would still have allowed for EVA. However, there was no way for an astronaut to make his/her way underneath Columbia without special equipment not present onboard. Such a contingency, however, has been discussed in the past, and some crews have actually undergone some basic training in this regard. In the case of STS-107, Michael Anderson and David Brown were trained to do a spacewalk, and they had the suits to do it. However, neither Astronaut was trained to do anything more than a relatively simple emergency repair, like freeing a stuck radio antenna or fixing a jammed latch that could cause the ship to burn up during re-entry. Moreover, an EVA to reach the underside of the wings would be not only impossible, it would be quite probably suicidal, because there is nothing to hold on to, and the Astronauts did not have mini-jetpacks to propel themselves. The astronauts could have floated off and never gotten back to the shuttle.
Ironically, Anderson had discussed in an interview in the Summer of 2002 as to how he would go about reaching a stuck hatch or landing gear cover on the underside of the Shuttle . He would have first had to rig a 60-foot tether to a makeshift weight - a bag filled with enough mass - then lasso it over one of the wings, and provided the weight provided a secure anchor against the edge of the wing, crawl along the line hand over hand to reach the hatch in question. While Anderson was optimistic he could have pulled it off for a stuck hatch, repairing tiles would probably have been a far different story. The time constraints of the EVA suits, combined with the uncertainty of an untried "seat-of-the-pants" spacewalk, would have taxed the limitations of man and support system. Odds are is that even if the Astronauts made it underneath and succeeded in the repairs, they probably would not have had enough oxygen to make it back inside.
- In an interview by James Oberg with several NASA flight controllers since the loss of Columbia, another, more ambitious, and significantly more dangerous spacewalk option has come to light. According to these flight controllers, one recently-debated contingency plan called for an EVA, during which an Astronaut would unhook their tether from the Shuttle, and the shuttle would fire its thrusters to gently move about 200 feet away from the Astronaut. It then would roll 180° in order to face the orbiter's underside towards the free-floating Astronaut. This would in theory allow the Astronaut to visually inspect the area of suspected damage and - hopefully - take digital still images and zoomed video. Then, the Shuttle would complete the roll another 180° and then manouver to retrieve the Astronaut, "like a giant catcher’s mitt enveloping a pop foul."
- Finally, even if the crew could have gotten underneath and secured themselves. they did not have the tools or materials onboard to allow them to perform any repairs. After the first incident involving tile loss during ascent on STS-1, NASA had briefly considered a tile-patching kit. One was put through development phase that was essentially a high tech caulking gun. The idea was to simply fill in the hole left open where a tile had come off with an ablative material similar to that which was injected into the honeycomb aluminum structure of the Apollo heat shields. However, testing found that the ablative caulking actually undermined the performance of the tiles, and the repair kit was scrapped.
Most of these facts were confirmed at the initial press debriefings following the loss of Columbia. Ron Dittemore, NASA Shuttle program manager, has gone on record as stating that the crew had no capabilities to tile repairs, and that even if they could perform an EVA, because there is nothing around that area for the astronauts to hold onto, they would have had an impossible task of even getting under the Shuttle to get a good look.
Finally, a clarification is in order regarding whether Columbia was equipped with an airlock capable of allowing EVA operations. Below is a link to an image clearly showing the layout of the payload bay contents of STS-107.
PHOTO NO: KSC-02PD-0978
http://mediaarchive.ksc.nasa.gov/photodetail.cfm?MediaID=9872You can see that there is indeed a hatch near the front of the tunnel, so an EVA would have been possible.
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It's a nice idea, and it was actually tried during STS-1 when tiles were lost during ascent on Columbia. However, due to atmospheric distortion the images taken with ground-based cameras were totally useless due to the poor resolution. As for the satellite photos taken with the Department of Defense "Keyhole" spy satellites, their effectiveness is still in question to this day. As the capabilities of the "Keyhole" satellites is still top secret, only serious space historians and reconnaissance historians such as James Oberg, Allen Thompson and Dwayne Allen Day have had any semblance of access to the documentation and any "leaked" results of such a use of these high-powered optics. All three have pretty much concluded that the 1981 imaging was unlikely to have provided anything useful, and that any such reports regarding usable photos of Columbia while in orbit with regards to resolving missing tiles are likely nothing more than an "urban legend".
But that was 1981. Two decades later, ground cameras are now being equipped with laser-based adaptive optics, and even commercial satellites are capable of resolving details previously visible only by the big secret military birds. Even with these advancements, while odds have improved that at least one camera would have had the required resolution, the odds are still much less that Columbia would have been in position for any camera to have detected any damage on the underside of the Shuttle.
Naturally, people are asking why NASA didn't make the attempt. During one of the first post-mishap press briefings, Shuttle program manager Ron Dittemore was queried about the possibility of using ground-based cameras to check for tile damage as was done during STS-95. Dittemore remarked that the ground telescope photos taken from Maui during the John Glenn flight after the drag chute door was lost on launch were not of sufficient resolution to aid analysis. What images have been released so far come from the Starfire Optical Range at Kirtland AFB, and from the AMOS project at Maui.
The AMOS images can also be found at:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/investigation/amos/index.html
These images (some are infrared and some are visible light) are the clearest orbital images that I've seen of the orbiter, but they still don't show tile details, and they are of the upper surface. In addition, if there was damage to an upper wing near the fuselage, that damage would have been hidden by the payload bay doors.
As seen in this image overlaying RCC positioning with one of the AMOS images, RCC Panel #6 - the current prime suspect as the TPS breach point location - is clearly hidden from view by Columbia's cargo bay doors. The Starfire infrared image that was released on 2/7/03 currently only shows outline detail of the orbiter. Deliberate resolution befuddling due to national security concerns aside, the ability to discern individual tiles on a Shuttle in orbit or even during reentry still does not appear to be feasible with current imaging technology. As of 3/24/03, the CAIB released a newly enhanced version of the image. For more information, see Section V: What's the big stink about the camera that took the "Starfire Photo"?
On a side note, there have been quite a few amateur efforts to image the Shuttle and other objects in orbit. Since a picture paints a thousand words, here's a source for visual examples of amateur attempts at ground-based observations of objects in orbit:
This site has pictures of various satellites including the Shuttle and Mir taken from ground telescopes and compares some of them to close ups taken from recently released satellites. This includes a publicly released photo from Maui. It also discusses the use of Keyhole satellite photos during STS-1.
On a related note, on 3/24/03 AvLeak quoted sources inside the CAIB as having received a report from the US Air Force regarding data on Columbia's final re-entry as recorded by a Defense Support Program (DSP) missile warning satellite parked in geosynchronous over the Pacific Ocean. According to the sources, the report says the DSP first detected an "abnormal thermal signature" from Columbia while it was still 700 miles west of the California coast at 7:51:19am CST, approximately 26 seconds after the Shuttle entered peak reentry heating. This would have placed Columbia at approximately 9 minutes prior to final loss of signal.
This was extremely early in the re-entry phase, and is considered important as it indicates that re-entry heating may have had an immediate abnormal effect upon the orbiter as compared with the normal reentry thermal characteristics as observed on previous Shuttle flights. In addition, the first abnormal telemetry sensor data showing a temperature increase did not register until a full minute later. But 19 seconds before the DSP pickup, Columbia experienced five communications dropouts, each a second or less in duration. Although meaning of the dropouts has yet to be determined, some experts believe they could be an indication that a thermal event of some sort was affecting the Shuttle's antennas and/or avionics moments before the event became visible to the DSPs sensors.
On that note, it should be clarified here that DSP satellites do not return images such as the orbital photographic reconnaissance "spy satellites", but return only infrared signature data. This is by design, as DSP satellites are intended to track incoming missiles by the thermal effects they leave behind in the atmosphere as they travel towards their targets. In the case of Columbia, as part of training for ground support crews and for basic system checkout operations, DSPs routinely observe Shuttles during reentry and evaluate their thermal characteristics. The observations were simply part of standard procedures for the Air Force, and while photos were not possible with this sort of reconsat, the data returned nevertheless is of importance to the investigation.
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In theory, yes. First off, remember that its unlikely that Mission Control or the crew could have seen the event. It was all over too fast for human reaction times. Even had they seen the strike, it still takes time to evaluate the data and make the abort call.
Assuming that they saw the strike, and had time to analyze the data, the Shuttle has several abort modes prior to reaching orbit which might have avoided the conditions of reentry which may have caused the failure:
Intact Aborts are designed to provide a safe return of the orbiter to a planned landing site.
Contingency Aborts are designed to permit flight crew survival following more severe failures when an intact abort is not possible. A contingency abort would generally result in a ditch operation. Contingency aborts are designed to permit flight crew survival following more severe failures when an intact abort is not possible. A contingency abort would generally result in a ditch operation. In that case the crew bails out of the shuttle and lands on parachutes. It's unlikely that this situation would have been the case under any of the possible abort scenario's on this flight as it requires the shuttle to be in a stable, subsonic, low altitude glide.
It should be noted here in that bailing out isn't practical until the Shuttle has pretty much slowed to about Mach 1 or so. The highest height/speed successful ejections that I know about A-12/M-12/SR-71) took place at around 70-75,000' (21-23 km) at something below Mach 3. (A few of the emergencies that led to ejections started out that fast, but the airplanes was decelerating as they broke up). Given that bailing out of a Shuttle requires a somewhat stable platform, and reasonable smooth air outside, jumping is only possible from, at best, the 80,000' level, and more likely, at altitudes in the40,000' level. Even with an escape capsule, attempting a survivable separation from the shuttle airframe at Mach 12/200,00' (60 km) isn't going to happen.If the crew is going to stay onboard, then there are four types of intact aborts: abort to orbit, abort once around, transatlantic landing and return to launch site.
ATO mode is designed to allow the vehicle to achieve a temporary orbit that is lower than the nominal orbit. This mode requires less performance and allows time to evaluate problems and then choose either an early deorbit maneuver or an orbital maneuvering system thrusting maneuver to raise the orbit and continue the mission.
AOA mode is designed to allow the vehicle to fly once around the Earth and make a normal entry and landing. This mode generally involves two orbital maneuvering system thrusting sequences, with the second sequence being a deorbit maneuver. The entry sequence would be similar to a normal entry.
TAL mode is designed to permit an intact landing on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This mode results in a ballistic trajectory, which does not require an orbital maneuvering system maneuver.
RTLS mode involves flying downrange to dissipate propellant and then turning around under power to return directly to a landing at or near the launch site.
There is a definite order of preference for the various abort modes. The type of failure and the time of the failure determine which type of abort is selected. In cases where performance loss is the only factor, the preferred modes would be ATO, AOA, TAL and RTLS, in that order. The mode chosen is the highest one that can be completed with the remaining vehicle performance. In the case of some support system failures, such as cabin leaks or vehicle cooling problems, the preferred mode might be the one that will end the mission most quickly. In these cases, TAL or RTLS might be preferable to AOA or ATO. A contingency abort is never chosen if another abort option exists.
The Mission Control Center-Houston is prime for calling these aborts because it has a more precise knowledge of the orbiter's position than the crew can obtain from onboard systems. Before main engine cutoff, Mission Control makes periodic calls to the crew to tell them which abort mode is (or is not) available. If ground communications are lost, the flight crew has onboard methods, such as cue cards, dedicated displays and display information, to determine the current abort region.
Which abort mode is selected depends on the cause and timing of the failure causing the abort and which mode is safest or improves mission success. If the problem is a space shuttle main engine failure, the flight crew and Mission Control Center select the best option available at the time a space shuttle main engine fails.If the problem is a system failure that jeopardizes the vehicle, the fastest abort mode that results in the earliest vehicle landing is chosen. RTLS and TAL are the quickest options (35 minutes), whereas an AOA requires approximately 90 minutes. Which of these is selected depends on the time of the failure with three good space shuttle main engines.
The flight crew selects the abort mode by positioning an abort mode switch and depressing an abort push button.
For a full breakdown on each abort mode, NASA has a page dedicated to shuttle mission profiles that contains an extensive section on abort modes:
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/mission_profile.html#ato_abortNow, as to how this relates to the Columbia mishap, Assuming that they saw the strike, and had time to analyze the data, they only have four options:
- Continue to orbit, and carry out the mission while the data is analyzed further. Unlikely to lead to a different outcome.
- Make the abort call and execute an AOA abort: AOA still involves making a re-entry, so it's unlikely the outcome would have been different.
- Make the abort call and execute a TAL abort: TAL still involves a re-entry, so it's unlikely the outcome would have been different.
- Make the abort call and execute a RTLS abort: RTLS is extremely difficult and dangerous. This mode is only used when it's known with near certainty that other modes are unavailable, and that no other option exists. Given that it involves flying the orbiter under conditions of extreme aerodynamic stress, it's uncertain that the outcome would have been any different.
And again, there's the contingency abort, which requires that the Shuttle be in a stable, subsonic, low altitude glide, but cannot glide far enough to reach a suitable landing strip. If you've seen "Space Cowboys", you've seen basically what happens. The crew bails out of the shuttle, slides down a rail intended to direct the jumper away (hopefully) from the Orbiter's wings and OMS pods, and they land safely (again, hopefully) on parachutes. However, it's very unlikely that Columbia would have been in the correct position under any of the possible abort scenario's on this flight.
Given what NASA knew before the flight, there was no reason to choose anything but to continue to orbit. Even had they chosen to abort, it's very uncertain that the craft would have landed intact with the crew alive.
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Columbia was in an orbit where it doesn't meet up with the ISS. When you're going at 17500 mph (28000 km/h), changing direction requires a LOT of fuel. Also, in this flight, the shuttle did not have the docking system to dock to the station. And they still do not have any way to repair the tiles in space. And remember, neither the crew nor NASA had any suspicions whatsoever that anything was wrong with Columbia that would have required any repairs, much less an inspection.
Still, most people aren't clear on why Columbia was unable to get to ISS in the first place. Orbital mechanics and basic laws of physics made this impossible. When a shuttle takes off, it aims in one direction and then accelerates until it reaches its orbital speed of about 28,000km/h. This direction is called orbital inclination.
Or, to put it in layman's terms: Consider a large round frozen lake with smooth ice. You slide at 100 km/h from 12:00 to 06:00 (south) without any skates. A friend travels from 02:00 to 08:00 (southwest) at 100 km/h.
The goal is for you to shake hands with your friend while both traveling at 100 km/h. To achieve this, you would not only have to change your direction of travel to match that of your friend, but also do this such that your track will match that of your friend, after which, you can simply accelerate to catch up to him. If both are going in same direction but 100m apart (parallel courses), you can't shake hands. Now, think about what is required for you to change direction while sliding on ice.
Columbia launched to a 39° inclination. The Space station is at a 51.6° inclination. If you do a bit of simple algebra, changing course 12.6°s while maintaining 100km/h requires about 24 km/h acceleration or roughly one quarter of the acceleration that gave your 100km/h.
The shuttle accelerates from 0 to 28,000km/h during launch. Once in orbit, the main engines are without any fuel. Only the OMS and RCS engines are available, and their capability is roughly 1250 feet per second, or about 1400 km/h speed change (delta v). Subtract from that the amounts used to complete the orbit, on-orbit attitude control, as well de-orbit burn.
If you need one quarter of the 28,000 km/h speed to change orbital inclination, it means is 7000 km/h. So the shuttle has nowhere near what is needed to perform a orbital plane change of 12°.
In addition, even if it *had* been possible to reach ISS, Columbia's airlock did not have an Orbiter Docking System, the extra part the other shuttles have, that allows a shuttle to actually dock with the station. In order to move the Columbia crew over to ISS, an EVA would have had to been performed, which would open a whole new can of worms.
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Yes they did, but not ones that were rated for spacewalk duty.
The reason a total crew transfer via EVA would have been almost impossible to pull off is that Columbia was launched with only 2 EVA-capable space suits onboard. While the crew did have pressurized suits, these were the 7 Advanced Crew Escape Suits (ACES), which are essentially the same suits used on high-altitude aircraft such as the U-2. While these suits are designed are designed to hold up to the extreme low pressures a pilot would experience, they are not rated to withstand the high vacuum of space for any real length of time.
One problem is with the face mask seals on the helmets. They're only rated to withstand low pressures as would be experienced by a pilot in an unpressurized cockpit at 100,000ft (30 km). In addition, the suits are not as efficient at controlling CO2 buildup as an EVA suit. One study involving a simulated egress on the ground resulted in the majority of the participants unable to complete the egress due to CO2 buildup.
For a more concise breakdown on ACES, Mark Wade's Encyclopedia Astronomica has an info page dedicated to these suits:
Now, on a side note, there's been some talk by the press and on the newsgroups of the "rescue balls" - an insulated fabric sphere with a short-duration air supply that an unsuited Astronaut could zip him/herself up inside and be transferred from one spacecraft to another. However, the rescue balls were useful only if you assumed that a second shuttle would be able to go up to rescue the crew of a stranded one. Once it became clear that the launch frequency would never be high enough to make that a very likely occurrence, NASA quietly retired the balls.
Another Rescue Ball mockup providing another cutaway view of how the Astronaut fits inside. A series of photos showing how the Rescue Ball would be used in an emergency. The rescued Astronaut would get inside, seal up the Ball, activate his personal air supply, and the rescuer would the transfer the Ball to the rescue Shuttle.
A mockup of two Rescue Balls and an EMU in a Shuttle airlock. The only photo of a Rescue Ball on any of NASA's websites. Taken prior to the loss of Challenger, it features the six female Astronauts on flight status at the time. So, even if Columbia had reached ISS and achieved station keeping, an EVA transfer of the entire crew would have required several spacewalks in which only a maximum of two crewmembers could have transferred at a time, with additional delays encountered with transferring the two suits back to Columbia after each use.
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Was there even an EVA airlock on Columbia?
Apparently there's some confusion amongst some uninformed members of the news media, and even some marketing representatives amongst the aerospace industry, but yes, there was an airlock through which the crew could have performed an EVA if necessary. There is an non-negotiable Contingency EVA requirement for every single Shuttle mission. The crew must be able to go out and manually close the payload bay doors should they fail to close automatically. Shuttle crewmembers who are EVA rated practice this task in the Neutral Buoyancy Lab - the big water tank - for every single mission. Just because there is no scheduled EVA doesn't mean the capability isn't there.
For Columbia's internal airlock, the aft hatch that leads to the payload bay that would normally be used for EVA on missions like the HST repair instead led to a tunnel, at the end of which was SPACEHAB. About halfway down that tunnel is a hatch that opens upwards. This is what the Columbia crew would have used to do an EVA if needed.
Apparently those claiming there was no airlock on Columbia's last mission was unaware of or confused about the differences in orbiters. Columbia had the only internal airlock - which has only an aft hatch - while the others have an external airlock - which has both an overhead hatch and an aft hatch. Either of these can be used for EVA depending on what's attached to the other hatch.Bottom Line: The lack of an external airlock does not mean lack of EVA capability.
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After STS-1 first encountered the problem with tile loss, NASA rushed into development a "roadside repair kit" for the tiles. The kit consisted of the following components:
Spray-on silicon carbide
Cure-in-place epoxy foam (for missing tiles)
Pre-cured ablator (for bonding areas of greater 'damage')
During tests on the ground the epoxy foam was found to be prone to excessive outgassing in vacuum, and had difficulty adhering to test articles designed to simulate damaged areas of tile and wing. What did adhere was found to actually degrade the performance of the tiles adjacent to the patch.
But even if the kit had worked, there's still the issue of how to get the Astronauts underneath the Shuttle and allow them to stay there long enough to perform a repair attempt. Over the years of the Shuttle program, several Astronauts have discussed such procedures in correspondence with some of the regulars on sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle. The procedure is what NASA calls the Contingency ET Umbilical Door Manual Closure EVA procedure.
The procedure works something like this: Attach a rope anywhere you can on the hull. The other end of the rope has a small padded mass attached. In this case, the mass is a bunch of clothes in a bag, attached to a safety tether. The Astronaut then twirls the weight around and then lets it fly so it wraps itself around the hull. If all goes well, the Astronaut grabs it as it comes around, then attaches the other end to the hull somehow. Depending on the situation, this procedure can be modified so that the bag is lodged in the gap between the elevon and the body flap, instead of trying to go all the way around the orbiter. Once both ends of the rope are attached to hull the Shuttle has essentially a belt. Now the Astronauts can attach themselves to the rope via a standard sliding hook and pull along the rope to the underside. Once there, they can examine the damage and make repairs if possible.
It should be noted, however, that each of these Astronauts who've relayed this story didn't hold much faith in the odds of success for these procedures. The fact of the matter is that by design there are simply no safe translation paths below the Shuttle, and no rope-safe attachment points on the underside whatsoever. And without being secured to the hull, even small finger forces are enough to push you away from the Shuttle and strand you in space, Furthermore, the very act of throwing the bag or dragging a rope taut against the reentry surfaces are enough to damage a tile. In the end any efforts to attempt such an EVA would most likely do far more harm than good.Once it was determined that any such EVA would be suicidal at best considering the lack of any means of tethering the Astronauts performing the repair in place, all development on the kit was halted and the project shelved.
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The actual question is whether NASA could have prepped and launched another shuttle in time to rescue Columbia's five men and two women?
In theory, the answer is "maybe". However, there are a couple of important factors to consider here:
- Normally, it takes four months to prepare a shuttle for launch. But in a crisis, shuttle managers say they might be able to put together a launch in less than two weeks if all testing were thrown out the window and a shuttle were already on the pad.
Atlantis was in fact nearly ready to be moved to its pad at the time of the breakup, so it theoretically could have been rushed into service had reentry been deemed unacceptably unsafe. Once the two shuttles had rendezvoused, Columbia's crew could have moved to Atlantis via a series of EVAs. Note that in order to accommodate the entire Columbia crew, Atlantis would have had to fly with the minimum crew of two required to safely pilot a shuttle mission.
- Columbia had enough fuel and supplies to remain in orbit until 2/5/03 under normal resource usage. However, had it been determined that Columbia could not safely return to Earth, the orbiter could be essentially sacrificed to save its crew. As was done on the Apollo 13 mission, major systems could be powered down to conserve electricity, but again as with Apollo 13, the limiting factor would have been the supply of the Lithium Hydroxide used to absorb the carbon dioxide (CO2) exhaled during respiration.
There is only a limited supply of CO2-absorbing canisters carried on any Shuttle mission. Despite their importance, spares are limited due to weight constraints. Granted, the canisters are swapped out before they've exceeded their capacity to scrub the cabin air of CO2, but even if the used ones were dug out of the trash and reused, and CO2 levels were allowed to get so high as to be painful, there still wouldn’t be enough cleansing capacity in the air purification system for all seven astronauts to survive until the earliest-possible shuttle rescue. In fact, most "back of the envelope" calculations done by NASA staffers and other contributors to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle, as well as this FAQ, give the maximum amount of life support extension to no more than six or seven days - a whole week short of the best case scenario for launching a rescue shuttle if one were available.
Again, one must also keep in mind that neither the crew nor NASA knew there was anything seriously wrong with Columbia until the breakup occurred. The impact from the peel off from the External Tank was judged to have been a non-issue, and even if you have them ready to launch you don't send up rescue vehicles unless you really need them.
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They did. It was called Buran, and it's been long since retired.
Buran - Russian for "Snowstorm" or "Blizzard", depending on what transliterations source you use - was the Soviet Union's attempt at a reusable spaceplane. Clearly a response by the Soviets under Leonid Brezhnev to provide a competitive counterpart to the US Space Shuttle, the design ended up being aerodynamically a copy of that very same US Space Shuttle. As a result, many experts argue that Buran was nothing more than Soviet engineers taking published drawings and specifications of the US Shuttle and adapting them to Soviet aerospace construction methods and techniques. While there are a great deal of similarities between the two shuttles, there were major differences.
The Buran shuttle operated in combination with the Soviet's Energia modular booster system. The two combined greatly resembled the launch configuration of the US Shuttle, save that there were 4 liquid fuel boosters instead of two solid boosters. The Soviets had no real experience in production of large solid rocket motors, especially the segmented solid rocket motors of the type used on the Shuttle. Soviet project director Valentin Petrovich Glushko favored a launch vehicle with parallel liquid propellant boosters. As a result, the central core, instead of being just an External Tank, was a complete booster with 4 powerful engines.
In addition to their lack of experience, the Soviets had little with regards to reusable cryogenic engines. Most, if not all of their designs were one-shot disposable ones. As a result, Buran had no equivalent of the US Shuttle's SSME's, and only carried orbital and attitude thrusters. However, from the Soviet perspective at the time, by placing all the boosters on the Energia, this made Buran that much lighter, thus allowing for more payload capability.
After 12 years of development, the Energia booster flew two all-up operational missions, Buran itself flew into orbit on the second Energia launch on an unmanned test flight on 11/15/88. Ironically, the launch occurred while a snowstorm of sorts was in effect, with snow flurries and 20 m/s winds. 206 minutes after launch, Buran touched down, completing the first and only successful automated landing of a spaceplane intended for manned use to date. Despite some reported damage to the superstructure due to a minor failure in Buran's thermal protection system, the mission was considered a qualified success and a vindication of the Buran's design despite its dubious originality.
But this triumph short lived. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered a reevaluation of the Russian space programs, and after several years of waffling wound up canceling both Buran and Energia project on June 30, 1993. The cancellation was justified as both orbiter and booster lacked a mission in the post- Cold War Russian space program. Despite some efforts by elements of the Russian space programs attempting to find commercial markets for Russian-supplied launch capabilities, neither Buran nor Energia ever found a market to make their reactivation worthwhile.
Following cancellation, all Buran and Energia components were mothballed or sold off and converted to tourist attractions. The only remaining flightworthy Buran/Energia set was mothballed for possible future use, but was destroyed on 5/12/02 when the roof of the building where it was being stored collapsed. Of the Buran design, a total of 5 were built. Other than the one was destroyed, 3 are sitting disassembled outside the NPO Molniya factory where they were built, deteriorating in the weather. The remaining one is up for sale, but is *not* in any way a flightworthy vehicle, and absolutely could not have been converted as such in time to save Columbia.
Even a flight-ready Buran had been available, it couldn't have been launched. The Russians have no Energias left, and quite simply do not have any boosters comparable to Energia to launch it with. In addition, there's the issue of Columbia's orbital plane. For the same reasons Columbia could never have reached the ISS, Buran was incapable of rendezvous with Columbia. The Buran/Energia combo was restricted to an orbit inclination range of from 50.7 to 110 degrees when launched from Baikonur, and lacked sufficient fuel to change its orbital plane to match that of Columbia.
Those wishing more information on Buran and Energia should check out the following links:
- Mark Wade's Buran page on Encyclopedia Astronomica:
- Russian Space Web's Buran Page:
- Krzys Kotwicki's Buran & Energia site:
http://k26.com/buran/Buran_Energia_News/buran_energia_news.html
On a side note, a test article has been bought by an entrepreneur group and made over into an combination amusement-ride-like theater experience and refreshment stand in Gorky Park in Moscow. Those in the sci.space.* groups who have visited there noted that despite the rather high prices of the concession and souvenir stands, the exhibit is worth visiting if you ever make it to Moscow.
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Despite what Martin Caidin semi-prophesized in "Marooned", such a rescue is a difficult, if not impossible task to achieve. Especially if you're looking at sending one up to rescue a Shuttle.
- Even if the current Soyuz design could be launched single-handedly - currently, when Soyuz return vehicles are swapped out on ISS, a minimum of two Cosmonauts are required - with a total of seven Astronauts on board Columbia at the time, you would need to launch *four* Soyuz in order to recover the entire crew. Each Soyuz can only carry three people max, and there simply isn't enough room inside to add even one additional couch without totally compromising safety.
And no, don't even *think* about having one Astronaut sitting on another's lap. Considering the way a Soyuz capsule lands and the stresses that Cosmonauts encounter on a routine landing, this sort of "party pooling" arrangement would be pretty much a guaranteed suicide ticket.
- You can also add to this the fact that the Russians currently do not have enough Soyuz spacecraft available "off the shelf" and/or "ready to fly". Despite the huge number of Soyuz which have been built over the years, due to the current nature of the Russian space program in the post-Soviet economy, Soyuz vehicles are now constructed on an "on demand" basis.
- And finally, there's this small problem of Columbia lacking any sort of compatible docking mechanism by which Soyuz could dock and allow for a safe crew transfer. For the same reason as to why Columbia could not dock with ISS, some very hazardous EVAs would have to be performed in order to get the crew over to the Soyuz, and when you consider the issue of only two EVA suits available on Columbia, the probability of success becomes reduced to almost nil.
Note also that the lack of a compatible docking mechanism on Columbia also essentially ruling out an unmanned Progress resupply vehicle packed with supplies to give ground crews enough time to launch any sort of shuttle rescue.Bottom Line: a Soyuz rescue operation could have at best only saved four of the seven Astronauts, and that's only if everything on the Russian side of the operation worked flawlessly. While Soyuz has proven to be a very reliable vehicle, to this date it has not been required to launch on "zero warning" or function after same. The risks would probably have been prohibitive at best.
For the most concise info on the Web about the Soyuz TM and TMA series, check out Mark Wade's sections on these two Soyuz variants on Encyclopedia Astronomica:
- Soyuz TM:
- Soyuz TMA:
Be advised that Mark has over three dozen separate pages dedicated to the various Soyuz variants, and these are but the two latest that the Russians have produced.
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Simply put, Shenzhou isn't an operational vehicle yet.
Granted, the Chinese have sent up a few successful flights, but these were unmanned flights only. and while they've pretty much reportedly gotten most if not all of the bugs worked out that were encountered on these flights, the earliest the Chinese have admitted as a possible launch window for the first manned Shenzhou flight is October 2003. And even if they could have launched, pretty much the same restrictions apply to Shenzhou as do to a Soyuz.For the most concise info on the Web about Shenzhou, check out Mark Wade's Shenzhou section on Encyclopedia Astronomica:
On a side note, on 3/31/03, China announced that in light of the Columbia mishap, all man-rated Shenzhou models would be equipped with comprehensive safety systems allowing its “Taikonauts” to escape their spacecraft if there is an emergency. According to an article on the Web site of the Communist Party’s People’s Daily, the safety systems will be designed to "rescue Taikonauts from danger or mishaps at any time during their flight."
Currently, Taikonauts can escape the pod before liftoff via cables and/or high-speed elevator, much in the same way Shuttle Astronauts can escape a pad contingency situation. According to the People’s Daily article, entitled “Safety of Chinese Astronauts Guaranteed and Emergency Escape Assured,” ejection seats will be added, as well as the capability for the Shenzhou crew to exit the craft to be picked up by a rescue Shenzhou. During reentry, Taikonauts will be able to escape by ejecting or by reducing speed to minimize the effects of aerodynamic stress and reentry heating. The article also noted that the Shenzhou reentry module's shell is also being redesigned and reinforced to "withstand greater extremes of heat and vibration."
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It's an intriguing idea, and although basically simple in design, it's not without it's problems.
The basic idea is this. Assemble a payload module containing the supplies necessary to allow the Astronauts to repair the Shuttle and/or resupply the Shuttle to allow the crew to survive in orbit until a crew rescue and retrieval mission can be launched. Then launch the module into Columbia's orbital plane, but below the Shuttle in altitude, within three days of an alert. Once in orbit below Columbia the payload sits and waits while Columbia lowers its orbit as needed to catch up with the module and begin a standard approach. It might take a day or two to wind up station-keeping, but upon arrival Columbia would move in so that the payload was in or near the cargo bay, and the two mission specialists who've got EVA suits available would go out and grab it. After securing the module either the crew would then unload the supplies into the airlock and extend both their lifetimes and Columbia's. Once you've brought in the groceries, the crew can then go into a power-down mode by shutting down as many systems as possible and still maintain minimum life support, and see how long you can sit in the cold darkness and do "Apollo 13" impressions while waiting for rescue.
Sounds really simple, right? But again, there's problems here most people haven't thought of right off the bat:
First off, NASA doesn't have an off-the-shelf cargo canister that's made to fit on the top of a US-made booster, such as Atlas or Delta. The Russians could possibly do it with a Progress launched on one of their boosters, but they can't launch into the 39 degree orbit required to rendezvous with a Shuttle on a non-ISS mission as Columbia was. Using a ESA-made booster such as Ariane from French Guiana might be an option, but again there's no NASA payload module currently in existence that's designed to mate and properly separate from any booster in existence.
Secondly, you'd probably need to brief the crew on rendezvous, email up the checklists, and practice the rendezvous before actually performing it. The first and second parts are the easiest; it's the practicing part that would be the potential stumbling point. Rendezvous isn't as frighteningly difficult as it appeared to be at the start of the Space Age. The early Gemini flights proved that practicing rendezvous with a imaginary target was in fact fairly good practice. It's what you do when you need to actually grab onto whatever you've caught up with. As seen during some of the dead satellite retrievals on earlier Shuttle missions, it's one thing to meet up with an arbitrary point in space with no dimensions, and a whole different thing altogether to meet up with a three-dimensional physical payload that may or may not be just sitting there still.
Thirdly, let's say the crew has managed to position the Shuttle so that the payload is either in the cargo bay, or at least close to the airlock for an EVA. With no Remote Manipulator Arm on Columbia, the crew has to go outside and actually physically retrieve what's inside. Again, since there's no RMS in this case, the two Astronauts who perform the EVA would have to tether themselves to the cargo bay, the drift over to the payload and attach tethers to that as well. If the payload isn't close enough to grab, the spacewalkers will have to most likely push themselves gently towards the payload in such a way that they hopefully don't impart enough inertia against the payload and send it tumbling away. While difficult, it *can* be done - STS-49 retrieved a satellite that was spinning too erratically to be grabbed by the RMS when three Astronauts went out and grabbed it with their hands - but unless the payload module has handholds specifically designed to be grabbable it's going to be *very* risky at best.
Finally, there's the issue of just how long you can keep repeat the resupply process. Sure, you can keep sending the stranded crew care packages until you run out of boosters and Girl Scout cookies, but the real issue becomes the one area that can't exactly be resupplied - the Shuttle's onboard power. Unlike the other ship systems, you can't immediately "triage" the maneuvering systems in the aft end of the vehicle. Those need to stay online, especially those systems related to the OMS/RCS thrusters required for the rendezvous burns. Keeping these warm and alive requires using up the cryogens which power the fuel cells that in turn power the heaters for the thrusters. As the cryo tanks can't be refueled in orbit, the longer the thrusters have to stay online, the quicker the tanks get emptied. Once empty, the heaters die, and the OMS/RCS systems will freeze up and become useless. Granted, you might be able to perform some feat of "Duct Tape Engineering" to hook some spare batteries sent up with the payload module to extend the life of the heaters, but the bottom line in extending the Shuttle and the crew's lives is determined by how fast and how many times resupply can be accomplished before you either can't keep those heaters running and/or you run out of maneuvering fuel and/or some other failure occurs which renders the Shuttle dead or worse.
So again, in theory, this isn't an impossible concept, but it's not without its problems. And while NASA has absolutely no contingency plans along these lines in effect for the Shuttle, ironically this same sort of resupply concept was part and parcel of Hank Searls' "Pilgrim Project" concept that was batted around back during the really early days of the race to the Moon. As depicted in the movie Countdown starring James Caan and Robert Duvall, the plan called for sending a man to the Moon on a one-way trip, and if he manages to land safely you keep sending him supplies and replacement habitat modules until you figure out how to get him back in one piece.
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It didn't happen *again* - it happened for the first time. It's important to remember that the Challenger disaster was a *completely* different sort of accident to the Columbia disaster. And that's a misconception that a *lot* of people are receiving with their knee-jerk reactions to the loss of Columbia.
The big difference between the two losses is this: In the case of Challenger, engineers arguing against the launch were forced into having to prove that the launch would be dangerous, instead of management proving that it would not. Based on the evidence we've seen so far - and it's far more accessible than during the Challenger days - that quite simply doesn't seem to be the case in the Columbia accident, in which both management and engineers did what they were supposed to do - they saw the impact problem and studied it for days to determine if it presented a flight safety issue. They even asked non-Shuttle engineers for their opinions - the recently disclosed e-mail exchange between JSC and Langley offering worst-case scenarios being prime examples. After all the discussion and evaluation and scenario management, the majority opinion is that based on the information NASA officials had available at the time, the impact posed no flight safety.
Note that as we are still early in the investigation into the loss of Columbia, and that this opinion may prove wrong in the final analysis. In the meantime, the worst that can be said about the decisions and actions of the NASA flight controllers during with regards to the Columbia accident is that their assessment of the damage from the debris impacts at launch may have been incorrect or underestimated. It is clear NASA was not ignoring safety issues as it is argued was the case with the O-Ring problems prior to the loss of Challenger. In fact, twice in the last three years, NASA has grounded the entire Shuttle fleet for prolonged safety inspections and repairs. That's a far cry from the Challenger days.
Bottom Line: Challenger and Columbia, while both tragic losses, are two completely different sets of facts, situation and circumstance. In addition, the NASA of today is a far cry from the NASA of the day of Challenger, and a far cry better with regards to safety. Any attempt to claim Columbia is "Challenger all over again", or that NASA "didn't lift a finger to make things safer" or "murdered the crew through negligence" is nothing more than uneducated slander.
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While the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) still hasn't determined the true nature of the circumstances behind the loss of Columbia, some progress has been made towards making the Shuttles ready to fly again.
As of 3/12/03, NASA has begin preliminary work on returning the Shuttle fleet to service. According to William F. Readdy, NASA's associate administrator for space flight, a memo has been issued instructing agency officials to organize a "return-to-flight" team to plan for quickly making changes in the remaining Shuttles, both structurally and procedurally, so that the orbiters could possibly return to active duty well before the end of 2003.
According to Readdy, the March 12 memo said "The team will prepare for a safe return to flight as soon as practicable. As a goal, the [Space Shuttle Program] shall plan for corrective actions and reviews which support a launch opportunity as early as the fall of 2003." The memo also instructed engineers to review specific problems that already are being investigation by the CAIB, including suspected foam insulation that peeled off the shuttle's external fuel tank and smashed into the craft's left wing and may have damaged the thermal protection tiles on that wing. The "return-to-flight" team also is to review ways to inspect and repair damaged tiles while the shuttle is in orbit. Other issues to be studied are how the spacecraft is prepared for orbit, the policies on granting safety waivers and the methods used to identify in-flight safety problems and how those issues are relayed to top NASA management.
Readdy also stressed that NASA will not "prejudge" the conclusions of the accident review board, but will concentrate efforts on problems that the board has already publicly discussed, such as the foam insulation debris and possible broken tiles on the wing. "That's the elephant in the room," said Readdy. "We can't ignore those."
Because NASA is uncertain precisely what the CAIB will recommend, "they may have to use the buckshot approach," said Seymour C. Himmel, a retired NASA official and a former member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel that advises the space agency. "That means that anything that possibly could cause a problem would be fixed," said Himmel in an interview with the Associated Press. "It is a scatter gun approach that will touch on many problems areas that have nagged the program for years."
In addition to Readdy's "elephant in the room", there are additional problems that NASA engineers have worked on since early in the Shuttle program that need to be addressed. However, Readdy's new directive will send the engineers and planners back to the drawing board once again. One of these problems involves the External Tank Foam Insulation.
Peeling of foam insulation from the External Tank has happened on previous Shuttle flights, and engineers with both NASA and Lockheed have spent 20 years trying to solve the problem. Environmental concerns raised by the EPA forced changes in the way the foam was applied to the External Tanks, and the chemical formula has been altered from time to time in an effort to improve thermal performance and resistance to aerodynamic forces. But despite their best efforts, the tanks still shed insulation. Readdy specifically called for engineers to renew their efforts, while NASA Shuttle Program Director Ron Dittemore ordered changes in manufacturing and procedures "to preclude any loss of insulation."
In light of the loss of Columbia, NASA is evaluating a plan to encase in metal the regions of the External Tanks where insulating foam has sheared away on previous missions. Foam had separated from the same region of the tank on at least four earlier flights, including the October mission of the shuttle Atlantis. Though shuttle program managers did not consider foam debris a safety hazard, the October incident prompted them to begin looking at modifications that would keep the foam from separating from the tank.
According to agency spokesman James Hartsfield, a major redesign of the forward portion of the fuel tank is considered a prerequisite to returning the Shuttle to flight status. Specifically, engineers plan to focus on developing a method of protecting the foam insulating the bipod ramp which would call for the ramps to be encased in metal fairings resembling a mailbox. "The goal of the redesign is to eliminate or greatly reduce any potential for debris," said Hartsfield. "The metal enclosure is the leading candidate because it's a solid structure bolted to the External Tank. There would be no foam on top of it, so none to fall off as debris. It would provide a more robust design."
The 154-foot tall fuel tank also serves as the structural element supporting the Shuttle and the two SRBs, and the exterior is sprayed with an orange foam to help keep the propellants at the proper temperature to reduce boiloff. NASA engineers were already in the process of redesigning the bipod region, which consists of metal hardware that must be covered with multiple layers of sprayed-on foam. Under current procedures, the application process requires several days for technicians to hand-sculpt the foam at the base of each strut into an aerodynamic ramp. At the time of this writing, NASA engineers are looking at three possible redesigns for this region:
- The two bipod ramps would be covered with fairings made of Inconel, a nickel chromium alloy widely used in aerospace. This is the preferred redesign, as the fairing could be applied to existing fuel tanks in stock and offer easy inspection to engineers before liftoff.
- The foam ramp would be retained by itself, but reduced in size and reshaped to be more aerodynamic. At the same time, dense ablator material located beneath the foam would be removed to enhance the integrity of the foam.
- The amount of foam for the ramp would be significantly reduced, leaving some of the larger metal fittings exposed.
Although NASA has received no formal recommendations from the CAIB, Shuttle managers expect to settle on a redesign by the end of May 2003 and incorporate it into fuel tank production by the end of August 2003, Hartsfield said.
Another problem involves the Shuttle's Thermal Protection System (TPS), also known as the "tiles". While the use of the tiles was considered one of the most daring innovations of the Shuttle design, questions have arisen since the loss of Columbia as to whether a safer alternative now exists. "Using tiles in this way is unique to the Space Shuttle," Himmel noted. "Advances have been made, but nothing better for the environment where the shuttle has to go."
With regards to repairing damaged tiles while in orbit, NASA spokesman Kyle Herring also noted that "elaborate tile repair techniques have been developed to fix problems after the Shuttle is on the ground, but no practical means have been developed for fixing the tiles in space. All that is being looked at again." Herring also noted that any fresh look at this problem will most likely involve the international space station. As most of the planned Shuttle missions will be going to ISS, efforts should be made to enable crews to inspect the tiles from the station and possibly make repairs using new tools that are now being developed.
Both Readdy and Dittemore have also called for studies on how NASA could use Department of Defense spy satellites to inspect the shuttle while it is in orbit. In the course of the investigation, it has been confirmed that such imaging was suggested for Columbia prior to re-entry, but top NASA officials decided to rely instead on the engineering conclusions that there was no serious tile damage. At the same time, some unofficial inquiries were made of imaging possibilities with the DOD, but the DOD apparently dismissed the inquiries as requests as they were not conducted through official channels. One of the recommendations expected from the CAIB is for NASA and the DOD to develop lines of immediate communications between NASA flight controllers and the DOD elements in charge of remote imaging, and for the DOD to provide full and unquestionable cooperation with any requests for imaging.
Another issue to be addressed is whether the Shuttle reentry method Experts are also looking at the way the shuttle is flown during reentry. Dittemore ordered studies to see if the shuttle could return to Earth in a way that minimizes heating. "We fly about the most benign re-entry profile that we could fly," said Herring. "But in the wake of the accident they are going back to reaffirm that."
As to whether returning the Shuttle fleet to active duty by Fall 2003 is hasty, Himmel responded with an emphatic "Not at all," noting also that "many of these things have been considered before, and the solutions may involve simply pulling out earlier studies, dusting them off and invigorating them with fresh ideas."
As for when the Shuttle flight might resume service, according to Readdy NASA's tentative plans as of this writing call for the first post-Columbia mission to be directed toward continuing the construction of the International Space Station. The mission also would be used to rotate crew members now in the station. It has not been determined as of yet which of the three remaining orbiters will be assigned to this mission.